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NARRATIVE
Pol Vandevelde

The study of narratives is at the crossroads of several disciplines with significant
overlaps. Literary theory and semiotics have analyzed narratives in the ir structures,
roles, types, and ideological functions. Authors like Ro land Barthes, Gerard Genette
and Tzvetan Todorov o n the French s ide and Vladimir Propp and Mikhail Bakhtine
on the Russian side have provided a sophisticated framework within which narratives
came to be recognized in their specific identity. The reflection on history has gene rated an abundan t lite rature on the st atus of historical narratives with people like
H ayden White and Lo uis Mink. Some tre nds in ethics h ave emphasized the centrality of narratives either as a vehicle for ethical standards or as the very articulation
of such standards. A brand of virtue e thics, for exa mple, led by Alasdair Macintyre,
has recognized the role of narratives for manifesting and preserving ethical virtues.
Besides the overlap of disciplines dea ling with narratives, what complicates the
approach to narratives is their close connection to the two o ther fundamental
n o tio ns of discourse and text. Jacques D errida's focus o n text as an o riginal inscription
of any act of the mind and Michel Foucault's analysis of discourse as the framewo rk
within which subjects are able to articulate any claim have contributed to bring the
notion of narrative into philosophical discussion, but with a ce rtain ideological coloration with regard to the status of the subj ect and the no tion of truth . Like text and
discourse, a narrative is a fo rm o f mediation. What has largely m otivated the philosophical discussion abo ut narratives is precisely the q uestio n of whether thin king
needs o r does no t need a mediation.
The framing of the debate abo ut n arratives is largely due to Aristotle who in his
Poetics recognized the role of narratives o r muthoi, but on ly for lite rature and h istory,
which are both viewed as inferior to philosophy, although lite rature - tragedy fo r
Aristotle - is more philosophical than histo ry. It is only when the whole framework
of mimesis was questioned, fo r examp le, by German Roman tic is m , and when truth
was no longer simply a m atter of the mind directly grasping the sense of what is
external to it that the relevance of narratives came to be recognized to the extent that
narratives offer an articulation of what can become a candidate for truth. T his
reformulation of truth as something that is not simply opposed to fiction or free
from a linguistic articulation too k place at the same time that literature ga ined its
present status as an aesthetic production and histo ry became a well-established
discipline. I will focu s on the ro le of narratives in philosophy and more specifica lly
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in phenomenology, which has been one of the movements that has most forcefully
reframed our understanding of truth. I start by listing some relevant features of what
a narrative is and then examine how some phenomenologists have dealt with or used
narratives.

Narratives in a historical context
Since early times the basic unit of thinking has been judgment and its content or
expression, the proposition. This basic unit was compatible with a strong realist
position of Aristotelian provenance as well as with a theistic view of medieval character
or a modern account of Cartesian or Kantian inspiration. In all of these models, the
judgment and its accompanying proposition was the ideal tool to formulate reality's
essence (in the Aristotelian framework), God's plan in nature (in the theistic model)
or the subject's representation of reality (in the Cartesian or Kantian framework).
What is common to these different models is the unitary character of the source of
knowledge, be it the world, God, or the subject, respectively. Once this unitary
character was no longer seen as satisfactory or plausible, judgment lost its privilege
as the unifying device that could provide a warranted or true knowledge. There are
many reasons for such an explosion of the unitary character of the source of
knowledge. Among them is the fact that the plurality or diversity of views on nature
and the world in general both manifested the weakness of the prevalent models and
the attractiveness of alternative models. Another reason is that reality or the world
appeared far more complex than what a single subject could comprehend. A further
reason is the claim by subjects, who became aware of their plurality and diversity,
that their specific perspectives could not be subsumed under some general or
universal types.
Parallel to the many reasons behind the recognition of their central role, narratives
also have many different features that explain their attractiveness. Three of these
features seem paramount: (a) narratives are perspectivistj (b) they include an element
of fictionj and (c) they are open-ended and completable.
The very notion of narrative when used in matters of knowledge or accounts of
reality entails a specifically subjective character in the sense that a narrative is both
something that has to be performed by a human being and has an intrinsically
conversational character. As a performance it is an utterance that is social in nature
and which engages both the responsibility of the utterer and asks for the participation
of a listener to whom the narrative is addressed. Due to its conversational character
a narrative is not a definitely closed semantic unit, as a judgment can be, although it
has a beginning and an end. It usually does not claim to provide some final account
of what is the case, as judgments are usually understood to do. What narratives
provide, instead, is an articulation of what is the case or what took place, whether it
is an action, an event, or even a period of time, and they invite readers or listeners to
link this articulation not on the basis of its truth in terms of an adequacy with what
is the case, but on the basis of the relevance, fruitfulness, or future potential of such
an articulation. Narratives, thus, have in themselves a conversational component and
a malleability that judgments do not have and do not need.
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What m ay explain the persp ec t ivist ch aracter of n arratives is their relationship to
the future. Because they a re n o t directly accountab le to wh at is the case, narratives
also h ave the potential to con figure and to sh ape actio ns and events by linking
them to the future. Histo ry is continuo us ly rewritten by serious histo r ians neither
beca use their predecesso rs were careless an d ob livio us no r because they want to
promulgate their agenda o n past act io ns and events, but because they s pea k from the
pe rsp ective of a different future, in the sense that it is the anticipa tio n o f a certain
future we e nvisage that lead s u s to revisit a nd thus reinterp ret the past . It is the
future we anticipate fo r o urselves that see ms to mo tivate o ur interest in a history of
the U nited States fro m the p e rspec tive of the people (Zinn 2003) o r the tell ing of
what n ative A mericans suffe red. H ayden W hite and Paul Ricoeur, a mo ng others,
have led a sustained reflectio n o n this pe rspectivist and configurative power of
narratives. Analogously, the ava ilab ility o f n arrat ives in literature, fo r example, can
also sh ape o r reshape o ur co mmo n ways of looking at th ings and unde rstand ing
o urselves. R icoeur has h ere again been a pio neer in th is reflectio n (1 984, 2004).
Som eone like M artha Nussbaum h as also sh own how reading literature o r narratives
can enrich legal procedures by allowing judge and jury to see defenda nts otherwise
than solely thro ugh lega l mo lds (1995). In this regard the reading of nove ls can
in fo rm pu b lic reasoning and give new tractio n to ratio nality.
Bes ides their perspectivist ch aracter , narratives also includ e an ele ment of fiction.
T he re is in a narrative a sto r ytell ing co mpo n ent that canno t be neatl y encapsulated
in the fact that " it is a bo ut " so mething, as the can o n ic d efinitio n of judgment
spec ifies : to state so meth ing of som ething. T he fund am ental opacit y of the "of" o r
"about" something had to be acknowledged o nce it became accepted that the unitary
character o f knowledge could n o lo nge r be expected eithe r fro m the su bject or from
reality itself, wh ich only "spea ks" thro ugh the proxies human subj ects believe they
are. Thus, the preposit ion "of" or "about" was no lo nger a mere syntactical marker,
but revealed an o nto log ical c h aracte r of reality: as Soko lowski says in another,
Husse rlian, context, reality is " infused with syntax" (So ko lowsk i 2000 : 88). A nd it is
this o nto logica l syntax that as ks fo r a sto r ytelling. N o w, sto rytelling o r fictio n is not
to be understood in the modern or pre-m odern sense as if fic tio n could be assessed
in its fictitio us make-up by co mparing it with a naked o r immediately accessib le
reality. Since it is this ver y reality that is syntactic, providing the syntactic articulation
of an actio n o r an event is indeed inventing something. It is an articulatio n in words
and sentences of something that did n o t exist in the action o r the event themselves,
since these are not made o f wo rds. H o wever, th is invention is no t a fa brication of
som ething that had no effective materializatio n before. And it is n ot a m ere discovery
o f what that actio n or event was, since actio ns and events reveal them selves - almost
pho tograph ically - th ro ugh the n arratives that are given o f the m .
Still, even if we grant that narratives reveal the relevance o r fruitfulness of actions
and events, do narratives evac uate the possibility of judging that som e acco unts are
true and o thers are fa lse? It m ay be that n arratives render judgments m ore careful
and mo re complicated , but ultimately it is still judgments that d ete rmine whether a
histo rian is a revisio nist o r a serio us o n e and whether an eye witness is just a
good sto ryteller o r a truth-te lle r. In o rder to d etermine the validity o f n arratives one
could ap peal to the d istinctio n E. D . Hirsch m akes between ve rbal meaning and
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significance in the case of texts (Hirsch 1967: 31). Applying these notions to actions
and events, we could say that the significance of an action or an event is what
they mean to us, whereas the meaning is included in the action and event itself, not
relative to us.
Unfortunately, while the distinction works neatly in small units of discourse, like
a sentence o r a small text, which are also directly availab le to other observers,
the distinction loses much of its sharpness and attractiveness when we are dealing
with a larger narrative, like a h istorical account, and when our access to the object of
the narrative is made through a long chain of mediations, as in the case of the distant
past. For example, when we are dealing with the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides
offers us a powerful and coherent account, so powerful, however, that it is not clear
how we could distinguish the meaning from the significance of the Peloponnesian
War. The meaning of an action or an event may be simply the significance this
action o r event has for us when we are blind to our own background and fra mework
of reference. In other words, it may be only in a diachronic perspective, when we
are removed from a particular background or framework of reference that we can
make the distinction between the meaning a particular event had at the time it took
place and the significance it has for us. For example, we can see the meaning of
Andrew Jackson's eviction of the Cherokees that forced them to move on a "trail of
tears " to Oklahoma, a decision that was largely accepted and praised at the time, and
the significance such a decision has for us now, when Jackson's action is largely
blamed and condemned.
If the distinction between meaning (which is supposed to be intrinsic) and significance
(which is supposed to be extrinsic) is a retrospective q ualification in a diachronic
perspective, and thus, as such, a category of interpretation, th is distinction cannot by
itself determine the truth of a narrative. What it can do is to validate a narrative
through an interpretive process. As a consequence, when dealing with the truth of
narratives, we have to accept an element of fiction, in the sense that truth is configured
and is a matter of invention instead of mere discovery. While this may vindicate one
of Martin Heidegger's main philosophical contributions that truth is disclosure, this
element of fiction has also prevented a theory of narrative from establishing itself as
a full-fledged candidate for a new theory of truth . And this may be due to the third
feature of narrative (besides perspectivism and fiction): narratives are open-ended.
While n arratives in o rder to be narratives clearly need to h ave a beginning and an
end, the end is only of the perspective taken . Since narratives present themselves as
perspectivist, there is inscribed in their core a radical openness that makes them
amenable to being continued. This continuation can take different forms . We can
revisit narratives, as we do with history, biography, or when we reinterpret the canon.
We can amend narratives by adding new perspectives to what Lincoln realized or
what Nelson Mandela achieved. And we can reject past colonialist narratives that do
not fit with our values.
This fact that narratives are not definitive, although they make a claim to the
truth , that they are finished, but not definitively complete, in short that they are
completable, may be the most strik ing aspect of our current situation in the twenty-first
century at a time when we h ave fully acknowledged the mediation of narratives. The
explosion of types of narratives, whether of personal, sexual, gender, or ethnic
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identity, whether of religiou s, social, or political allegiance, has certainly multiplied
the m an y voices people can find and borrow. But these t ypes of narratives seem to
have been antithetical to any common good o r any commo n set of values that was
supposed to be the basis for plurality and diversity. The different features of a narrative
mentio n ed above - perspectivism, fiction, incompleteness - we re gained against a
unitary source of knowledge that they were supposed to replace , but the unity was
expec ted to remain in the thread, as it were, of plurality a nd diversity. Narratives
were supposed to be a source of knowledge. Now we are at a point where the p lurality and diversity of na rratives have relativized the very n ot io n of knowledge and
with this relativizatio n room has been mad e for power to take over discourse. S uch
a s ituatio n is remarkable , if not paradoxical, and Lyotard tr ied to address it in his
own way (1984). On the one hand , in m ost social discourses praise is showered on
plurality and diversity of narratives, but, o n the other, there is one single discou rse at
the econ o mic level: global capital, which has become the reference document for most
economists or politic ians and which functions as the vernacu la r of ordi nary people.
Despite the plurality of narratives motivated by a des ire to unmask any meta-narrative,
this econo mic d iscourse functions unimpeded as a meta-narrative and at the same
time feed s a multiplicity o f narratives while escaping the ir bite and scrutin y. This
remarkable situation may po int to a limit of a decentered a nd disseminated narrative
knowledge when it com es to issues of social and econo mic justice.

Narratives in phenomenology
Phenomenology has been o ne of the m ost powerful philosophical movemen ts to try
to reformulate the notio n of truth by examining its many m ed iations. The most
impo rtant of these n arrative mediations has been literature. Almost all phenomenolog ists fro m Ro man Inga rd en to Jean-Pa ul Sartre, from Heidegger to Ricoeur have
seen in literature an invention of meaning. Among those who have exp licitly refl ected
upo n narratives in the narrow sense, French thinkers distinguished them selves. with
Ricoeur and Lyota rd as the main re presentative fig ures. While both Ricoeur and
L yota rd have offered an explicit theory of narratives, th in kers like Fo ucault and
D errida h ave explo red o ther aspects of the view that knowledge is narrative in
nature .
Bo th Ricoeur and Lyotard appeal to the Greeks and especially Aristotle. It is all
the more noteworthy that their focus is rather o pposite. Ricoeur, following Aristotle ,
exploits the potential of emp lo tment: a narrative makes explicit through words,
senten ces, metaphors, etc., the implicit syntax that already lies at the heart of actions
and events. Narratives fundamentally unify . By contrast, Lyotard brings attent ion to
the stifling effect of narratives when they become a meta-narrative in the sense of an
all-e ncompassing synthesis. Let us examine briefly these two o pposite uses of narratives.
Ricoeur

Ricoeur cu ltivates the ambiguity of narratives: they allo w us to understand time,
actions, oneself, and history, as well as what constitutes the make-up of those
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"entities," altho u gh time is clea rl y not narrative just as action is no t m ade of words.
This cultivated ambiguity is also in the cano nic Husserlian refo rmulation of
conscio usness as co nsc iousness " o f" so mething, the prep os ition linking o bj ect and
consciousn ess in their ontological status, but in a way that does n o t " de-realize"
objects as me re mental entities and does not valo rize consc io u sn ess as what
prescribes its o rder to the wo rld in a Kantian fash ion . Still, Ricoeur nicely illustrates
the different features that were listed above, since the actio n as it is in its articul ation
cannot be sep a rated fro m the und erstanding of this actio n. Narratives thus serve
both as mediato r - what allows us to understand act io ns and histo r y - and as the
meaning content o f actions and events - it is only when recounted tha t we know
what an actio n o r event means. N a rratives comb in e - o r confu se - the o ntological
and epistem o logica l levels. At the o nto logica l leve l an act ion or eve nt is narrativemade in the sen se th at an act ion h as a pre-narrative q uality and is wh at R icoeur ca lls
a "potential n arrative" ; at the episte mo logical level o ur understanding of actions and
events is narrat ive-l ike in the sen se that it is only in telling a story of what h a p pened that
we can come t o know what happe n ed . As Ricoeur says, the past d oes n o t give itself,
because it is no t o bservable, but h as to be reconstru cted o n the bas is of testimonies.
These two as pects of " narrative-made" and " narrative-l ike" are q uite a p rovocative
device in o rde r t o approach an d render the past . In the case of time, Ricoeur
attempts to show how time is unde rstood , no t wha t t ime is; in the case of selfhood ,
there is a priv ilege o f the first-pe rson perspective so that the self to a large extent
depends on how the self understa nds itself. Thus, the claim that the self is made of
narratives is a weak onto logical cla im since it is rath e r the self-u nd erstanding that is
narrative-mad e. It is not so with actions and past events wh ich are thoroughly submitted to intersubj ective scrutin y and can not be invented by an ind iv idual irrespect ive
of what the pu b lic record is. T hu s, to claim that ac tio ns and past events are narrative-made is a rath er stro ng cla im and will be a good test not o nly fo r Ricoeur's
theory of na rratives, but also fo r the o nto logical pla u s ib ility of narratives.
The com mon view that a narrat ive about actio n and past events reco unts them
such as they were m anifes ts the c h allenge of a theor y of narratives. Fo r , this apparently s imple claim involves what R icoeur calls the three genres of sam en ess, d ifference,
and analogy. The genre of sam e n ess is involved to the extent that historians, for
example, are con s idered h isto ria n s p recisely becau se they claim that what they
recount in their n a rrative is "th e same" as what too k place; this is indicated by the
word "such ." But the genre of " diffe re nce" is also in volved since the re is a difference
in nature between a narrative m ad e o f words and sentences, on the o n e h a nd , and an
action or event m ad e of ph ysical m ovements and gestures performed by people of
flesh and blood , o n the other. Fin a lly, the word "as" in the expressio n "s uch as they
were" points to the genre o f "analogy." The past h as to be recovered and reconstructed and thus req uires a media tio n that the nar ra t ive offers: the n a rrative exe rts
the functio n o f rep resenting (representance) or stand in g-in (lielltenance) whic h offers an
equiva lent of wh a t took place (Ricoeur 1988: Vol. 3, 143).
Ricoeur b elieves that this express io n of "such as they were" illu strates a dia l~c tic
between wh at h e ca lls the three levels of mimesis. The sameness claim ed by the
narrative toward what is narrated ass umes that ac tio n s and events the m selves are of
a narrative structure. Th is is wh a t Ricoeur calls " M im es is )" as the pre-narrative level
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of action and events. " Mimes is z" is the actual level of te lling a narrative of what took
place, providing an explicit articulation of what was implicit in action and events by
giving an analogon or a representing of it. The additional level of "Mimesis}"
represents the impact the level of "Mimesisz" has on h ow we can act and beh ave
(Ricoeur 1984- 88: Vol. 1, 72). Narratives re-signify the world of action in the sense
that we borrow narratives in order to act, behave , or unde rstand . Literature is, in
this regard , what Ricoeur calls a labo ratory for moral judgments. This intermingling
of narrative levels is a reformulation of the hermeneutic circle of Heideggerean and
Gadamerian provenance: actions and experiences already have a pre-narrative quality
so that rendering them in a narrative is n either redundant - merel y re peating the
sa me structure - no r violent - imposing a different structural o rde r; rather, it brings
them intelligibility and does the m justice .
Ho weve r, this latte r · point has left Ric oeur unsatisfied. We need some form o f
d ev ice to make sure that what is qualified as "pre-narrative" is intrinsicall y such, in
itself, as it were, and not a retrospective qualification made from the perspective of
the narrative that has been offered of it. In other words, we need some guarantee
that the stories to ld abo ut actio ns a nd events are not mere sto ries or "as if" stories that
m ere ly help us understand actio n s and events, but that these sto ries are " true " stories, b ringing to light the "meaning" that those actions and events have in themselves. In
Time and Nanative Ricoeur tho ught that the notion of a debt could guarantee the fai rn ess o r the correctness of the n arrative enterprise. Because historians are grabbed by
a past that speaks to the m , they feel a debt toward what took place or toward the
s uffering o f victims, for example; this attitude creates an ob ligatio n for historians to
do justice to the past. Although it is richer than a mere dialec tica l movement
between levels o f narratives in the threefold mimesis, Ricoeur acknowledges that th is
n o tion of debt m ay not be eno ugh to guard the pre-narrative level from being a m e re
retrospective qualification mad e by those who tell the story (2004: 279).
Ricoeur revis its his views in M emoT)', History, Forgetting, o rigina lly published in
2000, and appeals to the notion of attestation. Attestation is mo re than a mere existential attitude of being-in-debt, because it also includes the possibility o f just ification.
What attestation does is to introduce in the narrative the parameter of the one who
manifests herself as the author respons ible for the narrative. This means that the
histo rian , for example , presents her self as the author of the narrative and, by implicitly
saying " Here I am," opens herse lf to being questioned and criticized, but also moves
the discuss ion furth er by also asking for further evidence or counter-evidence fo r
the claims made (2004: 181).
This notion of attestation has two advantages. It acknowledges as uncircumventable
the fact that the past cannot be merely retrieved such as it was. Because the past is
" no more," it can o nly be attested to in its character of " having b een " or "having
passed, " thus in the traces it h as left of its passage. The "suchness" o f the narrative the "such" in the expression "such as it was" - neithe r replaces n o r represents the
"actually h appened, " but allows it to reac h its public presence and thus to be
accessible. Ricoeur considers that this " representing" (representance) adduces an
" in crease of being" or an " inc rease of sense" or an " increase of meaning." T he
second advantage of attestation is that it links the claim to recover the past such as it
was to the moral standing of the pe rson who tells the narrative. Although it is
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through the significance the past has to the author of the narrative that the meaning
of what happened is articulated in the narrative, attestation makes the author of the
narrative in principle accountable to what happened. While there is no empirical
possibility to move back from the narrative as articulated meaning to the sense at the
level of the experiences the narrative recounts, in principle attestation guarantees
that such an exchange back from narrative to past events is virtually possible to the
extent that the author of the narrative, if presented with conflicting evidence, will
have to justify what she wrote, modify it, or retract it. Attestation makes the author
of a narrative accountable and thus inscribes at the heart of narratives a process of
justification. Narratives are stories and performance, and as performance they are
social and moral acts in the public sphere.
Lyotard
Lyotard uses narratives in two different and somewhat opposite ways. In the Posrmodern
Condition Lyotard drew attention to the fact that in our post-industrial societies we
cannot appeal to a meta-narrative that would unify all our discursive practices. This
has led to a dissemination of knowledge and its transformation into power. While
assenting to the view that all knowledge is narrative in nature Lyotard criticizes
the sciences in general for denying their narrative character. He attempts to unmask the
hidden narratives of justification and legitimacy that provide sciences with their
status and these hidden narratives are ones that appeal to the mastery of nature and
the increase of power. By unveiling these hidden narratives at the heart of a knowledge
that claims to be free of narratives , Lyotard also wants to show that our post-industrial
societies are deprived of any all-encompassing narrative, what he calls a meta-narrative,
that would bring into a unity all the multiple narratives of morality, politics, or
knowledge. People do not have faith anymore in the ideal of progress or emancipation or justice for all. As Lyotard claims, reason also gave rise to Auschwitz. This
rupture between our post-industrial societies and the tradition that preceded and
nurtured them is the starting point of what he calls a postmodern era.
In his ambitious work, The Differend, Lyotard offers a more systematic view of the
link between narratives and discourse. He breaks down the entity of a narrative into
what he calls "phrases" and emphasizes the performance aspect of "phrasing"
something as well as the importance of the link between phrases, which include units
of discourse as well as gestures (1988: xii). The different types of discourses - moral,
political, economic - determine the modes of linking a phrase onto another. As
speakers we are submitted to these discourses and modes of linking phrases in order
to be recognized as reasonable speakers and professionals. Even stronger, we only
become subjects when we have learned how to link to a series of phrases that precede
our own occurrence. One of the most original notions Lyotard brings to the fore is
what he calls a "differend" (1988: 3- 5). Given the precedence of discourses and types
of phrases, there are some facts or events that may not be susceptib le to be articulated in the idioms or phrases that are current in a community or society and thus
cannot reach the level of a narrative in which this unformulated deed, act, or event
could be publicly discussed or litigated. Lyotard calls such an unformulated potentiallitigation a "wrong." What may hint at such a wrong are silence, anger, pain or a
feeling of powerlessness. Because such a wrong cannot be identified, even by those
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who suffer it,' it is a " differend ." However, there is also a productive aspect of such
differends , for they as k for a change in the way we link onto existing phrases. They
ask for n ew modes of articulating what heretofo re could n o t be spoken of.

Derrida and Foucault
A discussion of narratives within phenomen o logy cannot ignore the important reformulatio n of this n otion by D e rrida and Fo ucault, each in his o \\'n incomparable way .
Derrida does n o t spea k of narratives, but rather of texts, especially in his earlier
period, claim ing that " there is nothing o utside of the text " (2004: 158). By taking
iss ue with the self-identity that thinking and, by association, the subject claim to
have, D errida engaged in a rather productive enterpr ise of "decon structing" o r
sh owing the " disse minatio n " at work in severa l canonic works of the Western
traditio n. By appealing to a process of inscription that precedes and makes possible
the intentio nal acts of subj ects, Den"ida atte mpts to sh ow that the very conceptual
oppositio ns that we n eed in o rder to think , lik e interna l versus external, proper
versus metaphorica l, o rigina l versus inte rpretation, are effects, rather than fo undations.
As a conseq uence, the interpretation of a text, for exa mpl e, cann o t claim to take the
o riginal as an object, but can o nly graft o nto the origina l, continuing it and this
means: writing anothe r text. The net result is that any claim to truth, validity, o r
accuracy is relati vized to the process of linking to a text within the gene ral text o f a
particular histo rica l period, with particular goals, a particular location in a culture
with its own id eo logy , etc.
In the case of Foucault, one of his m ain interests has been the internal organizatio n
of a discourse and the types of discourses . From Birch of the Clinic to Madness and
Civilization and from The Order of Things (Foucault 1971) to Discipline a nd Punish he
has ana lyzed theo retically as well as e mpiricaIly the status of what h e calls a "statement,"
and the different m odalities such a state ment can take within different discourses.
Discourses, whether clinical, econo mic or sc ientific, a re essen tially practices and
Fo uca ult speaks of discursive practices. An object o nly exists within a network o f
relatio ns among institutions, econo mic processes; types of classification, m o d es o f
ch aracterization, etc. Although there is an evolution in Fouca ult's views, his fundamental goal has remained constant: to bring to the fore the rules accord ing to which
discourses are formed. ince these discourses are the sp ace as well as the framework
within which an ything, things as we ll as s ubj ects, has to be articulated in o rd e r to
reach a level of soc ial recognitio n and intelligibility, unve iling the rules of discursive
practices amo unts to show ing both the roots of o nto logy as well as the variations
and tran sformatio ns of o ntologies in the course of time.
See also Jacq ues Derrida (Chapter 10); History (Chapter 21); Hermen eut ics
(Chapter 45); D econ struction (C hapter 46); Post-structuralism: Mich el Fo ucault
(Chapter 48); The social sciences (Chapter 57); Literar y criticism (Cha pte r 58).
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